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Abstract 
 This practicum explores the role of health insurance coverage for Individual 
Development Account (IDA) participants.  Health insurance operates as a significant mediator 
for savings and asset accumulation, increasing the likelihood of success by 10% to 20% 
depending on the savings outcome and altering the likelihood of success by 26% to 75% 
depending on the outcome for certain participant sub-groups.  Specifically, participants with 
health insurance are more likely to be savers (save $100 or more); make higher average monthly 
net deposits and cumulative deposits throughout program participation; are less likely to drop out 
of the IDA program prior to making a matched withdrawal; and more likely to make an asset 
purchase with their IDA savings and matching funds.  In addition, medical debt is a savings 
barrier for IDA participants and has a statistically significant detrimental effect on each of six 
IDA savings outcomes, decreasing the likelihood of success by 11% to 34% depending on the 
outcome.  Both IDA program administrators and policymakers can use these findings to improve 
and expand upon the current IDA policy model and ensure participant success. 
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Introduction 
 Asset poverty, low net worth, and lacking health insurance coverage are major problems 
for many Americans.  The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in 1998 reported that a 
disturbing quarter (25%) of American households had less than $10,000 in net worth.1  Asset 
poverty is two to four times more persistent than income poverty.2  Asset poverty affects certain 
demographic groups at disproportionately higher rates than the rest of the population. The asset 
poor, those who live in households that lack the financial resources to support themselves at the 
poverty level for three months during a suspension of income, tend to be younger, nonwhite, 
non-elderly with children, female-headed households with children, renters, and less educated.3  
A startling 47 percent of all American children live in households with no net financial assets.4   
Despite the importance of having health insurance for both health and financial 
outcomes, the number of Americans in the United States who lacked coverage rose to 45 million, 
or 15.6%, in 2003.5  The percentage of uninsured people who are in low-income families (with 
annual incomes below $25,000) was 24.2% in 2003.6  This is problematic because uninsured 
people have less access to quality, affordable care than those with coverage and their health 
suffers as a result.7  They are also more likely to avoid or delay needed care because they cannot 
afford it, which may lead to unnecessary illness or even death, as well as to inefficient and 
expensive use of emergency room or hospital care for preventable health conditions.8   
                                                 
1 Hogarth, Beverly, and Hilgert.  Patterns of Financial Behaviors, p. 3. 
2 Caner and Wolff.  Asset Poverty in the United States, p. 5. 
3 Caner and Wolff.  Asset Poverty in the United States, p. 6. 
4 AFI Project Builder. 
5 Number of Americans without Insurance Reaches Highest Level on Record, p. 1. 
6 Number of Americans without Insurance Reaches Highest Level on Record, p. 3. 
7 Weil et al.  Improving the Federal System of Health Care Coverage, p. 401. 
8 Ku and Cohen Ross.  Staying Covered, p. 7. 
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  Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are matched savings accounts in which 
accountholders make regular contributions of earned income and then receive a match to their 
savings to ultimately purchase an asset, such as education or vocational training, a down 
payment on a home, or for microbusiness expenses.  IDAs have been established as a successful 
policy instrument for alleviating the asset poverty of low-income individuals described above.  
This practicum further explores IDAs, focusing on whether having health insurance is a mediator 
of savings.  I hypothesize that IDA participants who have health insurance will have better 
saving outcomes compared to their counterparts without health insurance.  Specifically, 
participants with health insurance have a higher likelihood of being savers;9 contribute higher 
average monthly net deposits and cumulative deposits into their IDA over the duration of their 
participation; are less likely to drop out of the program; are more likely to successfully finish the 
IDA program; and are more likely make an asset purchase with their matched withdrawal.   
 The rationale for this hypothesis is that health insurance will enable participants to 
overcome the savings barrier of medical expenses if they were to experience a health shock 
while enrolled in an IDA program without having to alter their behavior in response.  For 
example, they will not reduce their savings or drop out of the program – or worse, choose 
between attending to their medical needs and expenses versus sacrificing their health status in 
order to continue saving regularly.  Meanwhile, their counterparts without insurance might need 
to sacrifice their health needs, save less, or drop out of the program entirely in order to pay for 
their medical expenses.  In addition, those who pay for their own health insurance premiums on a 
regular basis will be better prepared for the required savings behavior of making regular deposits 
into their IDA, leading them to be more successful in maintaining their IDA and reaching their 
asset goal than their counterparts lacking this essential experience.   
                                                 
9 “Savers” are those participants who have saved $100 or more in their Individual Development Account. 
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 If my research shows that health insurance is positively correlated with savings outcomes 
for IDA participants, then this finding will contribute to the evolving field of IDA research and 
advise policymakers and program administrators of how to improve upon the current IDA model.  
For example, federal eligibility policies could be better coordinated to ensure IDA participants 
do not lose their health insurance if they save an amount in their IDA past the asset limit for 
Medicaid.  Additionally, program administrators and staff could accommodate their program 
design and case management practices accordingly to maximize participant success. 
 
Limitations of Current Body of Research 
 Due to the fact that the Individual Development Account field is a relatively new one, 
there has been a limited quantity of research conducted thus far.10  Previous qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of IDA programs and participants have revealed that IDAs are a feasible 
and successful anti-poverty strategy.  Additionally, research has provided great insight into 
numerous participant and program characteristics that are significantly correlated with savings 
outcomes in IDAs.  However, the specific role of health insurance in IDAs has only been 
minimally explored in previous quantitative research.  Furthermore, the studies of data from two 
IDA demonstrations11 that referenced health insurance only commented on two dependent 
variables – the probability of being a saver and the average monthly net deposit of IDA 
participants.  In addition to the desire to determine the effects of health insurance on other 
savings behaviors and outcomes of interest, such as program attrition and asset purchase rates, 
neither of these studies examined the potential varying effect of health insurance on sub-groups 
of participants.  Moreover, since the population of interest in the FAIM study was limited to rural 
                                                 
10 Michael Sherraden introduced his concept of IDAs in his book Assets and the Poor in 1991. 
11 Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM) Pilot and the American Dream Demonstration (ADD). 
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individuals, the findings might not be generalizable to participants in other communities.  In 
addition, the number of participants in this sample was relatively small (n=173).12  Thus, due to 
the limited sample examined in this study, its finding regarding health insurance might differ in 
other samples.  This study is also now outdated since the data used was current as of March 31, 
2001, whereas my data includes observations through November 2003.   
 Thus, this practicum fulfills the gaps in the existing body of research on IDA program 
and participants.  First, it satisfies the need for a more current analysis of the effect of having 
health insurance on asset building by using a larger and more diverse sample.13  Whereas 
previous research only examined the effect of having health insurance on one dependent variable 
each and/or for one specific sub-group of participants, this practicum also analyzes whether 
health insurance has an impact on multiple dependent variables, including probability of being a 
saver, average monthly net deposit, cumulative amount of savings, reason for exit from the 
program (i.e. drop out or finished), and probability of making an asset purchase.   Most 
importantly, this is the first quantitative analysis study dedicated entirely to the effect of health 
insurance for IDA participants.  To that end, I have the opportunity to explore numerous models 
and specifications to determine the impact of health insurance, as well as whether health 
insurance has unique effects for any sub-groups of participants. 
 
Hypotheses 
 In my analysis of health insurance as a potential mediator of savings, I continue to build 
upon prior quantitative research as well as qualitative surveys of IDA participants.  Specifically, 
I advance upon the qualitative evidence that reveals participants postpone doctor’s visits and 
                                                 
12 Grinstein-Weiss and Curley.  Individual Development Accounts for Rural Communities, p. 6. 
13 In my research n=1855 compared to n=173 in the FAIM research. 
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medical bills as a saving strategy and find illnesses and health care payments to be savings 
barriers.  As is shown in my Conceptual Model (see Figure 1), I focus on the independent 
variable of health insurance, meanwhile controlling for key participant and program factors 
previously found to be relevant for participant outcomes.  I hypothesize that IDA participants 
who have health insurance will have more successful savings and asset accumulation outcomes, 
including: higher likelihood of being a saver, larger average monthly net deposits and cumulative 
deposits, successful completion of the IDA program, and higher probability of making an asset 
purchase compared to their uninsured counterparts.   
 My rationale for these hypotheses is that health insurance will operate as a savings 
mediator by contributing to better health outcomes, allowing participants to work more, take less 
time off, and thus have more earned income to deposit in their IDA.  Additionally, without 
concerns of late medical bills, sacrificing one’s health needs, and paying high prices out-of-
pocket for medical emergencies and expenses that might arise, those with health insurance – 
whether they pay for it, receive it as an employee benefit, or receive public assistance – will be 
able to continue saving without having to reallocate their income or save less than their goal in 
order to pay for these expenses.  Finally, those participants who pay for their own health 
insurance premiums, similar to those who own cars and/or houses, have had substantial 
experience with saving in order to make regular monthly payments for their insurance premiums 
(or are potentially intrinsically better savers, an unobservable characteristic) and should thus be 
well prepared for the savings behaviors necessary to successfully maintain an IDA.14  On the 
other hand, there is always the possibility that the need to pay for health insurance premiums and 
related expenses out-of-pocket would mean that participants had little, if any money, remaining 
                                                 
14 I base this hypothesis on previous research that revealed that those who have already saved in the past – as 
signaled by the possession of a checking account, a passbook balance, a checking balance, a home, or a car – also 
tend to be more successful saving in IDAs.  Clancy et al.  Financial Education and Savings Outcomes, p. 6. 
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to save.  Ideally, my rationales for increased savings outcomes will override this potential re-
allocation of savings towards insurance premiums and significant findings will be determined.   
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Assets and Liabilities                 Pay less out of pocket  Drop Out of IDA program 
Income and Public Assistance         Less costly medical expenses Finish IDA program 
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Program Design        
Prior Relationship with Program 
     *If participant pays health insurance premium. 
ackground on IDAs 
In this section, background is provided regarding the importance of assets and health 
nsurance for health and financial outcomes, the savings and asset ownership status of low-
ncome individuals, and an overview about Individual Development Accounts and their success 
s an anti-poverty strategy.  Additionally, previous research analyses of the participant 
haracteristics and program dynamics that affect participant outcomes in Individual 
evelopment Accounts are reported.  
Asset-building opportunities are essential to help families gain financial skills, acquire 
ssets, improve their health status, and become self-sufficient.  Acquiring assets can determine 
hether a family and their future generations will “remain trapped in poverty or achieve the 
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wherewithal the escape.”15  Besides the obvious financial gains of building assets, research 
reveals that low-income individuals may experience improved health and well-being, as well as 
improved housing stability, increased civic and community involvement, decreases in marriage 
dissolution, and lower transfer rates of poverty to the next generation.16  In general, research has 
shown that homeownership, microenterprise, and post-secondary education – the most common 
asset goals of IDAs – are able to alleviate asset poverty.  Specifically, changes in 
homeownership and business ownership status are correlated with the transition probabilities of 
moving in or out of asset poverty.17  Similarly, more schooling reduces the chance of being asset 
poor.18  Overall, IDA participants contribute to the public good through their local and national 
economies by increasing the rates of savings, education, homeownership, and new businesses. 
 Health insurance is also a protective mechanism for low-income people to ensure 
successful health and financial outcomes.  Health insurance is especially crucial for low-income 
adults who tend to be worse off than higher-income adults for common access and health status 
indicators.   Even brief gaps in health insurance coverage can contribute to problems in accessing 
care, obtaining prescriptions, and paying medical bills, as well as maintaining continuous 
relationships with health care providers, which improves use of preventative and primary care.19  
Uninsured individuals also pay higher costs out-of-pocket and a larger proportion of their income 
for medical expenses than those with coverage.  Low-income individuals may spend between 5 
to 40% of their income on medical costs compared to middle-income adults who spent an 
average of 0.5% of income on out-of-pocket medical costs in 1999.20  The uninsured also pay for 
                                                 
15 Venner, et al.  State investments in Income and Asset Development for Poor Families, p. 1. 
16 AFI Project Builder, p. 3. 
17 Caner and Wolff.  Asset Poverty in the United States, p. 6. 
18 Caner and Wolff.  Asset Poverty in the United States, p. 24. 
19 Ku and Ross.  Staying Covered, p. vii. 
20 Ku, Leighton. Charging the Poor More for Health Care: Cost-Sharing In Medicaid.  
 Center for Social Development 8 
Washington University in St. Louis 
a higher share of their total medical expenses out of pocket (43%) than people with private 
(20%) or public insurance (7%).21  As a result, many of those without coverage report serious 
financial consequences, such as being contacted by a collection agency for unpaid bills, 
depleting their savings, or borrowing money in order to pay their medical bills.22   
People with low incomes are also more vulnerable than those with higher incomes and 
have trouble gaining or maintaining insurance because they are prone to more changes in family 
structure and employment status and are less likely to have employee-covered insurance.  For 
example, a survey of employers with large numbers of entry level jobs reported less than half of 
the employers offered health benefits, and only 6% provided coverage immediately; even among 
those companies that offered health benefits, one-quarter covered 50% or less of the cost.23  To 
further compound this problem, low-income people often have trouble obtaining – and remaining 
eligible for – public funded coverage, such as through Medicaid and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, due to restrictive income and asset eligibility limits and other procedural 
barriers.24  Thus, low-income workers are stuck between a rock and a hard place – by working in 
low-wage jobs, they are less likely to have health benefits and typically cannot afford private 
coverage, yet they may have income and assets above the allowed levels for public assistance. 
Despite the importance of assets, low-income families, who often live from one paycheck 
to the next, have enough difficulty satisfying their immediate needs with their limited incomes, 
let alone having enough to save for the future.  Furthermore, many low-income people lack 
access to traditional financial services.  About 9% of all U.S. families were “unbanked” in 
                                                 
21 Machlin, Steven et al.  Health Care Expenses in the Community. 
22 Ku and Cohen Ross.  Staying Covered, p. 7. 
23 Venner et al.  State investments in Income and Asset Development for Poor Families, p. 5. 
24 Ku and Cohen Ross.  Staying Covered, p. vii. 
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2001,25 meaning that they have never had a bank account; this percentage is much higher for 
low-income, younger, non-white or Hispanic families.26  While there are ways the U.S. 
government subsidizes savings and assets through tax incentives to save for retirement, invest in 
college, or buy a home, it is rare that low-income people can take advantage of these 
opportunities in the same way that middle-class and wealthier Americans do because they are in 
too low income brackets to qualify for these incentives.  For example, recent data on defined-
contribution savings (i.e. 401(k)s and IRAs) show that lower-income workers have significantly 
lower participation rates, contribution rates, and levels of retirement savings compared to their 
wealthier counterparts.27
 Individual Development Accounts are a policy instrument designed to alleviate this 
problem by providing opportunities for the poor to save and accumulate assets.  Accountholders 
make regular contributions of earned income into savings accounts and receive a match from the 
IDA program for their savings with the goal of ultimately purchasing a long-term asset.  IDA 
programs create and monitor these savings accounts, as well as provide case management, 
support services, financial literacy training, and asset-specific training for eligible low-income 
individuals and families.  Programs are typically operated by nonprofit social service agencies 
and financial institutions and are funded by foundations, corporations, and government entities.  
 Since the concept of the IDA was introduced just over a decade ago, this innovative anti-
poverty strategy has increasingly gained the recognition of policymakers and social service 
providers across the country.  Since 1993, thirty-four states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico have passed IDA legislation.28  It is estimated that about 20,00029 IDA accounts and at least 
                                                 
25 Caner and Wolff.  Asset Poverty in the United States, p. 5. 
26 Hogarth, Beverly, and Hilgert.  Patterns of Financial Behaviors, p. 3. 
27 Boshara, et al.  Policy Options to Encourage Savings and Asset Building by Low-Income Americans, p. 3. 
28 Edwards and Mason.  State Policy Trends for Individual Development Accounts, p. 1. 
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500 community-based IDA programs have been established throughout the United States.30  The 
“Assets for Independence Act” was passed in 1998 to establish a federal demonstration project to 
support IDA programs.31  Two other federal policies – Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
and Community Development Block Grant – approve uses of these funds for IDAs, including the 
match funding.  Additionally, two national policies related to IDAs were recently proposed – the 
ASPIRE Act” and “Savings for Working Families Act.”32
 In addition to the creation of policies and programs utilizing the IDA tool, several 
research evaluations and studies have been conducted to further explore program and participant 
outcomes – the American Dream Demonstration (ADD),33 Family Assets for Independence in 
Minnesota (FAIM),34 Michigan IDA Partnership (MIDAP),35 North Carolina Individual 
Development Account Evaluation,36 Native American Savings and Asset Accumulation in 
Individual Development Accounts,37 and the Assets for Independence Act Evaluation (final 
report forthcoming).38   
 The American Dream Demonstration is the first and largest systematic study of 
Individual Development Account programs.  In the ADD, the approximately 56% of participants 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 While gratifying, this number represents well below one percent of the eligible population.  Boshara, et al.  Policy 
Options for Achieving an Ownership Society for All Americans, p. 7.  
30 Edwards and Mason.  State Policy Trends for Individual Development Accounts, p. 1. 
31 Assets for Independence (AFI) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has provided over 300 
grants to nonprofits and state, local, and tribal government agencies to implement an IDA program.   
32 The ASPIRE Act, which would provide every child with an account at birth that would be endowed with $500 and 
supported with progressive, targeted savings incentives until age 18, was introduced in July 2004 and is scheduled 
for reintroduction early in the 109th Congress.  The Savings for Working Families proposal, which in the past had 
been stand-alone bi-partisan legislation, would authorize tax credits to financial institutions that set-up and matched 
the IDAs of 300,000 persons over a seven-year period, is now part of the CARE Act, which will not include the IDA 
tax credit.  Boshara, et al.  Policy Options for Achieving an Ownership Society for All Americans, pp. 3, 7. 
33 Schreiner, Mark, et al.  Saving Performance in the American Dream Demonstration: Final Report.    
34 Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, et al.  Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota Research Report.  
35 Losby and Robinson.  Michigan IDA Partnership Year Three Program Evaluation Report.   
36 Gorham, Lucy, et al.  Low-Income Families Building Assets: Individual Development Account Programs. 
37 Burke, Carey.  Native American Savings and Asset Accumulation in Individual Development Accounts. 
38 Mills, Greg, et al.  Assets for Independence Act Evaluation: Interim Evaluation Report. 
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with net deposits of $100 or more were designated as “savers.”39  The average participant had 
total net deposits of $528 and total net deposits plus match averaged $1543 compared to non-
IDA savers whose savings account balance was an average of $269 and checking account 
balance of $281.  The average participant had average monthly net deposits of $19.07. 
 As mentioned above in the “Limitations of Previous Research” section, participant health 
insurance and health care needs have only been marginally examined in previous evaluations of 
IDAs.  The results of those studies are provided here.  First, in the American Dream 
Demonstration, people with health insurance are almost 9 percentage points more likely to be 
“savers” than are people without health insurance; this is a substantively and statistically 
significant effect, increasing the saver rate from 56% to 65%.40  The ADD researchers 
hypothesized this effect could be because people with insurance need not self-insure by keeping 
a stash of ready cash available in case they have to go to the emergency room and can instead 
allow people to save in illiquid forms such as IDAs.41  Also using ADD data to research the 
effect of IDA program match rates, Schreiner shows that the “probability of being a saver” 
increased by 6.4 percentage points for those with health insurance.42  However, this finding was 
not statistically significant at conventional levels with a p-value of 0.16.43   Another study, the 
Family Assets for Independence in Minnesota (FAIM) pilot project, explored the effects of IDAs 
in rural communities.  In this analysis, researchers noted that having health insurance was 
statistically associated with $5.18 higher average monthly net deposits (p=.029) and 
hypothesized that the explanation for this is finding is that “those participants who do not have 
                                                 
39 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 3. 
40 Schreiner, Mark, et al.  Saving Performance in the American Dream Demonstration: Final Report, pp. 44-45. 
41 Schreiner, Mark, et al.  Saving Performance in the American Dream Demonstration: Final Report, pp. 44-45. 
42 Schreiner, Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, p. 34.  
43 Schreiner, Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, p. 34. 
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health insurance may have less money to save because of out-of-pocket health expenditures.”44  
ADD researchers comment that health insurance coverage also has a positive effect ($2.30) on 
AMND, but the effect was not statistically significant (71% confidence).45   
 Also related to health care, there is qualitative and quantitative evidence that access, 
quality, and affordability of medical care can be hardships for IDA participants.  In particular, 
medical emergencies, expenses, and prior medical debt are significant barriers to successful 
savings outcomes.  First, using ADD data to examine the effect of IDA program match rates, 
Schreiner reports that 18% of participants had late medical bills; the effect of each $1 in overdue 
medical bills debt decreased the net deposits made per month by $2.98.46  Next, when 100 
former Michigan IDA Partnership (MIDAP) participants were asked if they were struggling to 
have medical care, more non-graduates than graduates from IDA programs rated access to 
medical care as a problem – 46% of non-graduates found it to be a problem, while only 30% of 
graduates felt the same way.47  When asked about the quality of health care they can afford, 68% 
of graduates were satisfied, while 32% were dissatisfied.  Of non-graduates, 78% were satisfied, 
and 22% dissatisfied, though this finding was not statistically significant.48 Similarly, in the 
North Carolina Individual Development Account Evaluation, when former participants were 
asked to rate the importance of various factors in their leaving the program before completing 
their goals, illness was rated as very important by 37% and as somewhat important by 42% of the 
drop-outs; only 11% viewed this factor as not important in their decision.49  The fact that 
graduates of IDA programs rated health care access, quality, and medical problems as less 
                                                 
44 Grinstein-Weiss and Curley. Individual Development Accounts for Rural Communities, p. 7. 
45 Schreiner, Mark, et al.  Saving Performance in the American Dream Demonstration: Final Report, pp. 44-45. 
46 Schreiner, Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, pp. 20, 33.  
47 Losby and Robinson.  Michigan IDA Partnership Year Three Program Evaluation Report, p. 12.   
48 Losby and Robinson.  Michigan IDA Partnership Year Three Program Evaluation Report, p. 14. 
49 Low-Income Families Building Assets: Individual Development Account Programs, p. 47. 
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problematic than non-graduates indicates that they were perhaps better able to handle their 
medical needs and expenses and could thus successfully complete the program.  On the other 
hand, both difficulties accessing quality health care and illness were savings obstacles and 
determinants of attrition for non-graduates. 
 Even more disturbing than the evidence that IDA participants struggle to access 
affordable, quality health care and experience late medical bills is the finding that IDA 
participants postpone going to a doctor as a savings strategy.  About 17% of respondents of a 
cross-sectional survey (n=318) of current and former ADD participants and nearly one quarter of 
both graduates and non-graduates in the MIDAP interview sample (n=100) said that they 
postponed doctor or dental visits in order to save in their IDA.50  These findings show that 
obtaining quality health care can be a hindrance to IDA participants, especially those who remain 
in the program and find they have to spend less on medical expenses in order to do so (i.e. 
purchase lesser quality health care and/or lower quantity of health care by postponing doctor’s 
visits).  Clearly, individuals should not have to sacrifice their health – or choose between medical 
expenses and saving in an IDA – in order to build assets. 
 Previous evaluations have more extensively explored the role of key participant 
characteristics, such as income, assets, liabilities, and exogenous traits, in determining IDA 
savings outcomes.  In the ADD, income is not associated with being a saver or net deposits in 
IDAs, indicating that even those with very low incomes save as successfully as others.51  
Moreover, drop out depends more on previous debt than on income. In fact, very-low-income 
participants save at a higher rate relative to their income.52  Those with existing assets, including 
                                                 
50 Moore et al., Saving, IDA Programs, and Effects of IDAs: A Survey of Participants, p. 17; Losby and Robinson.  
Michigan IDA Partnership Year Three Program Evaluation Report, p. vii. 
51 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 4. 
52 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 4. 
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home ownership, car ownership, land or property ownership, and financial investments were 
more likely to be “savers” and have higher net deposits, especially if they were debt-free.53  
These findings could signal that participants are shifting other assets into IDAs, or that those who 
are already successful savers for the aforementioned assets are also better at IDA saving.54 In 
contrast, those participants with debt were more likely to drop out, potentially because these 
participants had greater pressure on cash flows and/or had fewer savings to shift into IDAs.55   
 Other participant characteristics, such as marital status, education status, race/ethnicity, 
age, location, rural/urban residence, and prior relationship with host organization were also 
correlated with savings outcomes. ADD researchers also note that unobserved participant 
characteristics, such as having a high “propensity to save,” may also affect savings outcomes, 
although they attempted to control for these unobserved factors.56  In addition, previous research 
has revealed that certain IDA program features appear to improve savings outcomes, including 
higher match rates, monthly savings goals or targets, the number of hours of financial education 
(up to a point), and a structured program with incentives, information, and facilitation.57   
 
Data and Sample 
 The data that is used in this study was collected from programs that participated in the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD) pilot program.58  ADD is a demonstration of IDAs in 
fourteen programs across the United States. It ran for four years (1997-2001) and the data were 
                                                 
53 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 4. 
54 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 4. 
55 Schreiner and Sherraden.  Drop-out From Individual Development Accounts, p. 6. 
56 Schreiner, Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, p. 2. 
57 Sherraden, Michael.  Individual Development Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 3. 
58 The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) in Washington, D.C., designed and guided the ADD.  The 
Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis designed the research and the MIS 
IDA management information system for data collection. 
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collected over the course of seven years (1997-2003).59  I used the most recent enrollment data 
available that contains updates current through November 2003.  Program staff in ADD collected 
data with a software package designed to help them manage IDAs.  The system recorded 
account-structure parameters at start-up, participant demographic and economic data at 
enrollment, and IDA cash flows in each month.  The cash flow data come from bank records.   
 From 1997 to 2003, the American Dream Demonstration had 2,350 participants enrolled 
in fourteen IDA programs.  In order to examine only those participants who answered the 
question regarding health insurance status, I first dropped each observation that did not respond 
to this question; thus, my data sample includes 1855 participants.  Additionally, I created 
“missing” indicator variables for independent variables when numerous observations were 
missing to take advantage of each of the 1855 participants that answered this question. 
 Those individuals with household income under 200% of poverty were eligible to 
participate in the ADD.60  All programs provided matches for home purchase, post-secondary 
education, and small business, and some also provided matches for job training, home repair, and 
retirement saving.61  The mean (and median) match rate is about 2:1, with a low of 1:1 (27% of 
participants); six percent of participants in ADD have a match rate between 4:1 and 7:1.62  ADD 
participants held their IDAs as passbooks accounts in banks or credit unions.  Participants were 
also required to attend financial education classes.   
 In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics on the health insurance status, income, and 
asset levels of participants in my ADD sample in order to show the disadvantaged status of this 
                                                 
59 Schreiner, et al.  Saving Performance in the American Dream Demonstration: Final Report, p. iii. 
60 Schreiner. Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, p. 18. 
61 Schreiner. Mark.  Match Rates, Individual Development Accounts, and Saving by the Poor, pp. 5-6. 
62 The match rate is the number of dollars disbursed by the IDA program to a vendor for each dollar withdrawn in a 
matched withdrawal. The match rate may vary among participants in a given program, so the average match rate is 
taken not across programs but across participants.  Schreiner, Mark, et al.  Saving Performance in the American 
Dream Demonstration, Final Report, p. 3. 
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sample and the importance of creating a bank account, saving, and acquiring an asset through an 
IDA for improving participants’ economic security.  The high level of liabilities, especially 
medical debt, indicates that this population has costly health care needs and clearly struggles to 
purchase this care.  Approximately 66% of participants in this sample had health insurance.  The 
average monthly household income of participants was about $1,514 with a standard deviation of 
$897.  The average total assets for participants in the sample were $19,662 with a standard 
deviation of $37,640; the average net worth was $4,994 with a standard deviation of $25,123.  At 
enrollment, 22% of participants owned a home, a significantly lower rate than both the national 
homeownership rate of 68% and the minority homeownership rate of 49%.63  Thirteen percent 
reported small-business assets or self-employment income.  Compared to almost 90% of all U.S. 
households, only 70% of my sample had a checking account.64  
 Also shown in Table 1 is information about participant liabilities.  Seventy-seven percent 
of the IDA participants in my sample had some type of previous debt.  The mean amount of total 
debt was $14,690 with a maximum of $272,700.  Specifically, 26% of this sample had medical 
debt or loans, a higher percentage than for any other category of debt; the average amount of 
debt for these individuals was $568 with a standard deviation of $4,382.  The maximum amount 
of medical debt by any participant was $150,000, which was second largest category of debt 
after homeownership debt.  After medical debt, the next two most frequently experienced 
categories of debt were education and home debt – two of the most typical asset goals.  Twenty 
percent of the sample experienced education (student loans) debt, followed closely by 18% of 
participants with home debt.  About 2% of participants reported business debt obligations.    
 
                                                 
63 Both homeownership rates were all-time highs in 2004. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Overview. 
64 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Table 1: Participant Insurance, Assets, and Liabilities 
 N Mean  Standard Deviation Median Min. Max. 
Insurance Status   
Health insurance 1855 0.66 0.47 1 0 1
Income and Assets       
Total assets  1855 196.62    376.40 35.00 0 4270.00
Total monthly income 1855    15.14   8.97 13.940 0 67.60
Net worth 1784   49.94 251.23 6 -2305.50 3490.00
Have checking account 1855 0.69 0.46 1 0 1
Homeowners 1855 0.22 0.42 0 0 1
Small business owners 1855 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
Presence of Debt   
Medical debt 1855 0.26     0.44 0 0 1
Home mortgage debt 1852     0.18   0.38 0 0 1
Student loans 1854 0.20 0.40 0 0 1
Business debt 1852 0.02 0.15 0 0 1
Total with any debt 1822 0.77 0.42 1 0 1
Amount of Debt   
Medical debt  1855 5.98 43.82 0 0 1500.00
Home mortgage debt 1853 80.94 217.19 0 0 1850.00
Student loans 1852 21.93   88.29 0 0 1400.00
Business debt 1852 2.85 43.26 0 0 1300.00
Total amount of debt  1855 146.91 264.45 38.00 0 2727.00
 
 Table 2 provides information for the six dependent variables explored to see the baseline 
of IDA participant outcomes in this sample.  Sixty-two percent this ADD sample saved $100 or 
more and are thus designated as “savers.”  The average monthly net deposit was $18.12, while 
the average cumulative deposit amount over the duration of program involvement was $624.   
Thirty-four percent of participants exited the IDA program due to drop out and 24% successfully 
finished it.  Additionally, 40% made an asset purchase with their IDA savings and match. 
Table 2: Dependent Variables 
 N Mean  Standard Deviation Median Min. Max. 
Saver  1855 0.62 0.49 1 0 1
Average monthly net deposit 1855 18.12 20.06 12.50 -3.91 153.85
Gross deposits in IDA 1855 624.01 747.24 411.66 -140.76   6000.00
Drop out of IDA program 1855 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Finished IDA program 1855 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Made asset purchase 1855 0.40 0.49 0 0 1
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 In Table 3, I present the descriptive statistics for each key dependent variable by health 
insurance status.  Of those who achieved successful outcomes by being savers, finishing the 
program, and making an asset purchase, the majority – about 67-68% – had health insurance.  
However, of those who dropped out, fewer participants – 62% – had health coverage.  These 
discrepancies of IDA outcomes by health insurance status perhaps indicate that insurance 
operates as a savings mediator and regression analysis is necessary to further explore this 
relationship.   
Table 3: Cross Tab of Dependent Variables by Health Insurance Status 
Frequency 
Row Percent N 
Without 
Health 
Insurance 
With 
Health 
Insurance 
Saver 1148 363 31.62
785 
68.38 
Drop out of IDA Program 637 243 38.15
394 
61.85 
Finished IDA Program 441 146 33.11
295 
66.89 
Made asset purchase 741 235   31.71 
  506 
68.29 
  
 In Table 4, I show the rates of insurance coverage for IDA participant sub-groups in order 
to discern whether some groups have better likelihoods of having coverage versus which ones 
might be more prone to being uninsured.  This also serves as an indicator for which sub-groups 
the impact of health insurance might vary during regression analysis.   Females are more likely 
than males to have insurance in this sample.  Asian American participants have the highest 
coverage rates in the sample, followed by Caucasians and African Americans; Native Americans, 
Latinos, and other ethnicities are the most likely to lack insurance.  Divorced/separated and 
married participants have higher coverage rates than those who are single and widowed, perhaps 
because the latter lack the support of a second income.  Rural participants are more likely to have 
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insurance than their urban counterparts.  Medical debt is problematic for both those participants 
who are insured and uninsured. 
Table 4: Cross Tab of Key Independent Variables by Health Insurance Status 
Frequency 
Row Percent 
 
N 
Without 
Health 
Insurance 
With 
Health 
Insurance 
Male  
 372
145 
38.98
227 
61.02
Female 1483 481 32.43
1002 
67.57
 
Caucasian 682 220 32.26
462 
67.74
African American 895 290 32.40
605 
67.60
Asian American 
 37
9 
24.32
28 
75.68
Latino 143 63 44.06
80 
55.94
Native American 49 21 42.86
28 
57.14
Other 49 23 46.94
26 
53.06
 
Single 883 323 36.58
560 
63.42
Married 417 134 32.13
283 
67.87
Divorced/Separated 505 150 29.70
355 
70.30
Widowed 41 17 41.46
24 
58.54
 
Non-rural 
 1609
572 
35.55
1037 
64.45
Rural (pop. 2,500 or less) 
 246
54 
21.95
192 
78.05
 
Have medical debt 484 183 37.81
301 
62.19
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Methodology Section 
 I estimate the six dependent variables as functions of participant and program 
characteristics using SAS to test my hypotheses; I use STATA to calculate the marginal effects 
for coefficient estimates of probit models.  For my first outcome, I use the probit technique to 
examine the “probability of being a saver” where the dependent variable indicates whether the 
participant saved above or below $100.65  The second dependent variable, “average monthly net 
deposits” (AMND), tracks all net deposits up to the match cap and represents the average amount 
a participant made into his or her Individual Development Account during each month of 
participation.  I use the OLS regression technique to test the hypothesis in this model.  For my 
third dependent variable, I again use the OLS technique to estimate “gross deposits,” which 
represents the cumulative amount deposited into one’s IDA plus interest, but not including fees, 
unmatched withdrawals, and excess balances.  For outcomes 4 and 5, two indicator variables 
reveal the reasons IDA participants leave the program – either due to dropping out or finishing.66  
Participants, who exited without having made a matched withdrawal because they lost interest, 
were unable to save, or violated program rules, were marked as “drop out.”  If they met their 
IDA savings goal and made a matched withdrawal, they were coded as “finished,” even if they 
also had unmatched withdrawals.  If participation has yet to end, then all the indicators are coded 
as zero.  I run two separate probit regressions for each these exit possibilities.  For outcome 6, I 
create an indicator variable, “asset purchase,” that indicates whether participants successfully 
made an asset purchase with their savings and match funds.  Those who made any number or 
type of asset purchase(s) as indicated by the “uses of withdrawal” variables are coded as a “1” 
                                                 
65 Sherraden labels those IDA participants with net deposits of $100 or more as “savers.”  Individual Development 
Accounts: Summary of Research, p. 3. 
66 A third indicator variable, “ineligible,” represents an alternative reason for exiting the program; however, none of 
the 2,350 participants in the ADD demonstration were coded as ineligible.   
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whereas those who did not make any withdrawals for an asset purchase were assigned a “0.”  My 
analytical technique for outcome 6 is probit. 
I estimate separate regressions for each of the six savings outcomes: Probability of Being 
a Saver, AMND, Gross Deposits, Drop Out from IDA Program, Finished IDA Program, and 
Asset Purchase.  For each outcome, I estimate five model specifications and add additional 
categories of independent variables until I build the following “complete regression model” (see 
Figure 2) and test the hypothesis that β1Health insurance ≠ 0.    
 
Figure 2: Complete Regression Model 
 
Savings Outcome = β0 + β1Health Insurance + Exogenous Participant  
Demographicsβ2+ Key Program Characteristicsβ3 + β4Medical Debt +  
Endogenous Participant Characteristics & Other Program Featuresβ6 + µ 
 
 
  
 Specification A is a simple regression testing the impact of health insurance on each 
dependent variable.  Specification B includes health insurance and the exogenous participant 
characteristics: gender, age, urban/rural residence, race/ethnicity, marital status, highest 
education completed, employment status, number of adults in household, and number of children 
in household.  Then, in Specification C, I additionally include key program characteristics, 
including the amounts of financial and asset-specific education completed by a participant, direct 
deposit, match rate, match cap amount, presence of a lifetime match cap, and time cap in months.  
In Specification D, I add the presence of medical liabilities to Specification C; “Medical Debt” is 
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an indicator variable expressing whether a participant has overdue medical bills.67  My 
“complete regression model” is Specification E, in which I add the remaining key participant and 
program features to the model that are potentially endogenous and may be determined jointly 
with health insurance status, including education, employment status, total monthly income, total 
assets, total liabilities, former TANF or AFDC status, current TANF status, current food-stamp 
status, and current SSI/SSDI status, and life insurance, and whether the participant was an 
employee of the organization that operated the IDA program, had a prior relationship with the 
host organization, or was referred to the program through a partner organization (see Figure 2).    
 Also, I estimate five additional specifications (F through K) to determine whether the 
impact of health insurance on savings outcomes varies for participant sub-groups.  For these 
specifications, I start with Specification D and separately include categories of interaction 
variables between health insurance and the following exogenous characteristics:  gender in 
Specification F; age in Specification G; rural residence in Specification H; various marital 
statuses in Specification I; household structure – the number of adults and the number of kids 
that live with the IDA participant in Specification J; ethnicity/race in Specification K.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Medical debt also serves as a proxy for the participant having trouble meeting their healthcare needs and costs 
since there is no variable for health status or out-of-pocket medical expenses in the ADD data set. 
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Results Section 
 Consistent with my hypotheses, health insurance operates as a mediator for IDA savings 
outcomes.  Participants with health insurance are more likely to be savers; make higher average 
monthly net deposits and cumulative deposits throughout program participation; are less likely to 
drop out of the IDA program prior to completion; and are more likely to make an asset purchase.  
 Although I test ten specifications for each of the six outcomes, I only present the results 
for the first five specifications (A through E) in their respective tables below and instead 
comment only on the statistically significant estimates found in Specifications F through K.  This 
discussion focuses on the coefficient estimates and marginal effects calculated in Specification D 
for each outcome, which controls for health insurance, medical liabilities, exogenous participant 
characteristics, and key program characteristics because it is the most complete model that 
consistently yields statistically significant results.68  In each box, the coefficient estimate is the 
top number, followed by the p-value.  For the binary dependent variables – saver, drop out, 
finished, and asset purchase (outcomes 1, 4, 5, and 6) – in which the probit technique is utilized, 
I additionally calculate and present the marginal effects for each estimate to show the percentage 
point change in the probability of being a saver that results from a change in health insurance 
status, i.e. having insurance versus not having it.  In these cases, the top and bottom numbers in 
each box remain the coefficient estimate and the p-value, respectively; the middle number 
reports the marginal effect.  A gray-shaded box indicates the coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant at any of the three conventional levels: 90%, 95%, or 99%.  A 90% confidence level 
(p ≤ .10) for the coefficient estimate is indicated by a single asterisk (*); a 95% confidence level 
(p ≤ .05) by two asterisks (**); and a 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) by three asterisks (***). 
                                                 
68 Perhaps the most “complete regression model” (Specification E) over-controls by including so many variables and 
thus does not produce statistically significant results. 
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Outcome 1 – Probability of Being a Saver  
 
 Table 5 presents the estimates of the probability of being a saver in an Individual 
Development Account.  In each instance in which the coefficient estimate for health insurance is 
statistically significant, the sign of the estimate is positive, revealing that insurance increases the 
probability of being a saver.  In Specifications A through D, the coefficient estimate for health 
insurance is positive and statistically significant.  In Specification D, a change in coverage status 
increases the probability of being a saver 6 percentage points from the mean of 62% to 68%.  
However, in Specification E, which controls for all key program and participant characteristics, 
the coefficient estimate decreases in magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. 
 
Table 5: Outcome 1 – Probability of Being a Saver (Probit) 
Coefficient estimate 
Marginal effect 
P-value 
Specification
A 
Specification
B 
Specification
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification
E 
Intercept 0.20 
***p=<.0001
-0.23 
p=0.1745
-0.55 
**p=0.0349
-0.48 
*p=0.0660 
-0.99 
***p=0.0042
Health insurance 0.15 
ME=0.06 
**p=0.0138
0.19 
ME=0.07 
***p=0.0034
0.17 
ME=0.07 
**p=0.0121
  0.1656 
ME=0.06 
  ***p=0.0167 
0.07 
ME=0.03 
p=0.3690
Medical loans/debt – – – -0.1828 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0131 
-0.1521 
ME=-0.06 
**p=0.0476
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
Characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Log likelihood    -1229.83  -1162.15  -1067.68 -1064.61 -998.59
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Outcome 2 – Average Monthly Net Deposit  
 Table 6 presents the results of examining whether having health insurance is correlated 
with the dollar amount of a participant’s average monthly net deposit (AMND) into his or her 
Individual Development Account.  In Specification A through E, each of the coefficient 
estimates for health insurance is statistically significant at the 95% or 99% confidence levels.  In 
Specification D, the results reveal that participants with health insurance have an average 
monthly net deposit that is $2.54 larger than those without health insurance, an increase of 14% 
above the mean AMND of $18.12. 
 
Table 6: Outcome 2 – Average Monthly Net Deposit (OLS) 
Coefficient estimate 
P-value 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification 
E 
Intercept 16.57 
***p=<.0001
17.11 
***p=<.0001
20.51 
***p=<.0001
21.85 
***p=<.0001 
15.47 
***p=<.0001
Health insurance 2.34 
**p=0.0178 
3.09 
***p=0.0010
2.66 
***p=0.0018
  2.54  
***p=0.0028 
1.75 
**p=0.0515
Medical loans/debt – – –   -3.47  
***p=0.0001 
  -2.66 
***p=0.0028
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Model F 5.63   
**p=0.0178 
20.32  
***p=<.0001
36.56  
***p=<.0001
35.91  
***p=<.0001 
22.13  
***p=<.0001
R² 0.01   0.14 0.32   0.32 0.38
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Outcome 3 – Gross Deposits in IDA over Duration of Program 
 In Table 7, I present the estimates of whether having health insurance is correlated with 
the total dollar amount a participant deposits in his or her Individual Development Account 
throughout the duration of the IDA program.  The coefficient estimate for health insurance is 
statistically significant at the 95% or 99% confidence levels in each of the Specifications A 
through E.  In Specification D, those participants with health insurance contribute $94.51 more 
than their counterparts without such insurance, increasing 15% above the mean cumulative 
deposit amount, $624, to $718.51. 
 
Table 7: Outcome 3 – Gross Deposits in IDA over Duration of Program (OLS) 
Coefficient estimate 
P-value 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification 
E 
Intercept 564.41 
***p=<.0001
555.92 
***p=<.0001
82.33 
p=0.4621
  131.31 
p=0.2421 
-93.91 
p=0.4963
Health insurance 89.96 
  ***p=0.0142
  119.97 
  ***p=0.0006
98.98 
  ***p=0.0011
  94.51 
***p=0.0017 
73.49 
  **p=0.0216
Medical loans/debt – – – -126.46 
***p=<.0001 
  -93.88 
***p=0.0031
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Model F 6.03  
***p=0.0142
20.33  
***p=<.0001
47.61  
***p=<.0001
  46.61  
***p=<.0001 
27.69  
***p=<.0001
R² 0.01 0.13 0.37 0.38 0.43
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Outcome 4 – Probability of Drop Out from IDA Program  
 
 In Table 8, I present the results of examining the probability of drop out from an IDA 
Program before making a matched withdrawal for an asset purchase.  Since the sign of each 
specification’s health insurance coefficient estimate is negative, participants with health 
insurance are less likely to drop out from the IDA program prior to completion than those 
without insurance.  Each coefficient estimate for health insurance is statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level in Specifications A through D.  In Specification D, having health insurance 
as a support mechanism is correlated with a 7 percentage point or 20% decrease in the 
probability of drop out, decreasing the average attrition rate from 34% to 27%.  However, in 
Specification E, which controls for all relevant program and participant characteristics, the 
coefficient estimate decreases in magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. 
Table 8: Outcome 4 – Probability of Drop Out from IDA Program (Probit) 
Coefficient estimate 
Marginal effect 
P-value
Specification
A 
Specification
B 
Specification
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification
E 
Intercept -0.2841  
***p=<.0001
0.14 
p=0.3945
   0.33 
  p=0.2130
   0.28 
  p=0.2933 
  0.83 
**p=0.0175
Health insurance -0.18 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0039
-0.21 
ME=-0.08 
***p=0.0013
-0.20 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0037
-0.19 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0050 
-0.07 
ME=-0.02 
  p=0.3915
Medical loans/debt – – – 0.14 
ME=0.05 
  *p=0.0607 
0.14 
ME=0.04 
  p=0.1432
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Log likelihood    -1189.09  -1129.13 -1047.87 -1046.12  -975.24
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Outcome 5 – Probability of Finishing IDA Program 
 Outcome 5 tests whether having health insurance is correlated with the probability of 
finishing an IDA program.  The coefficient estimates for health insurance are not statistically 
significant in any of the Specifications A through E because the magnitudes of the estimates are 
very small (see Table 9).  Thus, it is not clear whether insured participants are more or less or 
equally likely to finish their participation than those lacking insurance.  Alternatively, health 
insurance might not be statistically related to completing the IDA program at all.   A potential 
reason for inconclusive findings is the insufficient number of “finished” observations to analyze 
– only 23% of the sample had already finished.  However, that this outcome is inconclusive is 
not disturbing because the alternative reason for exit – drop out – is statistically significant.  This 
variable could be explored further when more complete data is available and to determine if 
there are other key variables that have been omitted from my model that are biasing the results.   
Table 9: Outcome 5 – Probability of Finishing IDA Program (Probit) 
Coefficient estimate 
Marginal effect 
P-value
Specification
A 
Specification
B 
Specification
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification
E 
Intercept -0.73  
***p=<.0001
  -0.73 
***p=<.0001
-0.43 
*p=0.1095
-0.31 
p=0.2494 
-0.24 
  p=0.7405
Health insurance 0.02 
  p=0.7446
   0.04 
  p=0.5356
  0.02 
   p=0.7405
  0.01 
   p=0.8508 
  -0.08 
p=0.3500
Medical loans/debt – – –   -0.2883 
ME=-0.08 
***p=0.0004 
  -0.27 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0017
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
Characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Log likelihood   -1017.33   -969.64   -919.94   -913.62 -851.52
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
         = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Outcome 6 – Probability of Making an Asset Purchase 
 I present the results of examining the probability of making an asset purchase with one’s 
IDA savings and match funds in Table 10.  In each instance in which the coefficient estimate for 
health insurance is statistically significant, the sign of the estimate is positive, indicating that 
health coverage increases the probability of achieving one’s asset goal.  Although the coefficient 
estimate for health insurance is only nearly statistically significant in the simplest regression I 
calculated in Specification A, the estimate for health insurance is statistically significant in the 
multivariate regressions in Specifications B, C, and D.  This change in significance is a result of 
the increase in the coefficient estimate from a very small magnitude in Specification A to more 
substantial magnitudes in Specifications B, C, and D.  In Specification D, there is almost a 5 
percentage point increase in the probability of asset purchase for participants with health 
insurance.  As a result of this positive effect, the average probability of making an asset purchase 
is raised from 40% to 45% when a participant has health insurance.  However, in Specification 
E, which controls for all key program and participant characteristics, the coefficient estimate for 
health insurance is again very small in magnitude and is no longer statistically significant. 
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Table 10: Outcome 6 – Probability of Making an Asset Purchase (Probit) 
Coefficient estimate 
Marginal effect 
P-value 
Specification 
A 
Specification 
B 
Specification 
C 
Specification 
D 
Specification 
E 
Intercept -0.32  
***p=<.0001
-0.42 
   ***p=0.0123
-0.64 
   ***p=0.0127
-0.58 
   **p=0.0268 
-0.94  
***p=0.0066
Health insurance 0.09 
ME=0.04 
     p=0.1306
0.13 
ME=0.05 
    **p=0.0447
  0.12 
ME=0.05 
     *p=0.0728
  0.12 
ME=0.05 
     *p=0.0875 
  -0.002 
ME=-0.01 
    p=0.9798
Medical loans/debt – – – -0.18 
ME=-0.07 
   ***p=0.0177 
-0.15 
ME=-0.06 
    **p=0.0569
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
– Yes Yes Yes Yes
Key IDA program 
characteristics 
– – Yes Yes Yes
Other key variables 
 
– – – – Yes
Log likelihood -1246.89    -1160.50   -1055.82   -1052.99   -975.29
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
 
 
Effect of Health Insurance on Savings Outcomes for Participant Sub-groups 
 
 In addition to calculating the impact of health insurance status on savings outcomes, I 
explored whether this effect varies by participant characteristics.  Overall, it appears that the role 
of health insurance does not affect different participants in diverse ways.  However, for some 
sub-groups, health insurance status does play a statistically unique role in their IDA outcomes, 
altering the likelihood of success by 26% to 75% depending on the outcome and sub-group.  
Potential explanations for this variation are that certain sub-groups are more vulnerable due to 
life circumstances, making them more likely than those more advantaged to experience savings 
barriers, have poor health outcomes, and/or lack extra unobservable support mechanisms.  For 
some sub-groups, health insurance is enough of a savings mediator to boost their performance, 
while others are still too disadvantaged to have insurance significantly improve their outcomes.   
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 Specifically, I find that compared to non-rural IDA participants, rural participants with 
health insurance have a 16 percentage point or 26% decrease in the probability of being a saver 
(outcome 1) from 62% to 46%.  For AMND, gross deposits, and asset purchase (outcomes 2, 3, 
and 6), widowed participants benefit more from having insurance compared to their single 
counterparts – they have $10.97 or 61% higher average monthly net deposits, make $402.84 or 
65% larger cumulative deposits, and are 30 percentage points or 75% more likely to make an 
asset purchase than single participants with insurance, showing that health insurance can be an 
significant support for this sub-group.  Of those with insurance, females are nearly 11 percentage 
points or 32% more likely to drop out (outcome 4) than males (23% compared to 34%).  Finally, 
divorced or separated participants with insurance are 8 percentage points or 33% less likely to 
finish (outcome 5) than single participants (16% compared to 24%), indicating that this group 
might face savings barriers for which health insurance cannot compensate. 
 
Effect of Medical Loans and Debt on Savings Outcomes 
 
 A related variable of interest, indicating whether a participant has any medical loans and 
debt, is significantly correlated with each of the savings outcomes that I explore.  Not 
surprisingly, medical loans and debt have a negative influence on success rates for IDA 
participants.  First, there is a 7 percentage point or 11% decrease in the probability of a 
participant being a saver with respect to a change in medical debt status from 62% to 55% (see 
Table 5).  In addition, those with medical loans have an average monthly net deposit that is $3.47 
or 19% lower than those IDA participants without medical debt (see Table 6).  Participants with 
medical debt deposit $127 or 20% less than the average cumulative amount deposited ($624) by 
their counterparts without this type of debt (see Table 7).  Those with medical debt are also 
approximately 5 percentage points more likely (39% compared to the average drop out rate of 
 Center for Social Development 32 
Washington University in St. Louis 
34%) to drop out of an IDA program and about 8 percentage points less likely (16% compared to 
an average completion rate of 24%) to finish than those without this savings barrier (see Tables 8 
and 9 respectively).  Furthermore, participants with this type of debt are 7 percentage points or 
almost 18% less likely (34% compared to an average asset purchase rate of 40%) to make asset 
purchases with their IDA savings and match funds (see Table 10).   The large effect of medical 
debt on these savings outcomes should be addressed to prevent this barrier from interfering with 
participants IDA goals and success rates. 
 
Effect of Other Key Variables on Savings Outcomes 
 
 During my analysis of whether health insurance impacts savings behaviors and outcomes 
in Individual Development Accounts, I also explored the role of other key factors on participant 
success.  Table 11 presents the coefficient estimates for other variables of interest from 
Specification E for each outcome. Many of these estimates are consistent with previous research 
findings.  For example, participant characteristics, such as gender, marital status, education 
status, race/ethnicity, age, location, rural residence, income, assets, and pubic assistance status 
were also correlated with savings outcomes.  Of particular interest to IDA administrators are 
findings regarding program structure and features; match rate, match cap, direct deposit 
opportunities, and general financial and asset-specific education provided by the IDA programs 
were confirmed to yield positive results for participants.   
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Table 11: Complete Regression Model – Key Variables for each Savings Outcome 
Coefficient estimate 
P-value 
Outcome 1: 
Saver 
Outcome 2: 
AMND 
Outcome 3: 
Gross Deposits 
Outcome 4: 
Drop Out 
Outcome 5: 
Finished 
Outcome 6: 
Asset Purchase 
Intercept -0.99 
  ***p=0.0042 
15.47  
***p=<.0001
-93.91  
p=0.4963
  0.83 
**p=0.0175 
-0.24 
  p=0.7405
-0.94  
***p=0.0066
Health insurance   0.07 
p=0.3690 
  1.75 
   **p=0.0515
  73.49 
**p=0.0216
-0.07 
  p=0.3915 
  -0.08 
  p=0.3500
  -0.01 
    p=0.9798
Medical loans/debt   -0.15 
   **p=0.0476 
-2.66 
  ***p=0.0028
   -93.88 
  ***p=0.0031
0.11 
  p=0.1432 
  -0.27  
***p=0.0017
-0.15 
    **p=0.0569
Female 0.04 
p=0.6397 
-1.83 
*p=0.0833
   -67.93 
  *p=0.0708
-0.07 
   p=0.4621 
-0.02 
  p=0.8022
-0.08 
  p=0.3866
Age 0.01 
  ***0.0133 
  0.13 
 ***p=0.0032
  4.36  
***p=0.0040
  -0.01 
   *p=0.0789 
0.01 
p=0.5489
  0.01 
p=0.2709
Rural 0.13 
  p=0.2719 
-0.48 
  p=0.7139
-6.59 
p=0.8871
-0.35 
  ***p=0.0031 
  0.05 
  p=0.6814
  0.04 
  p=0.6998
Married   0.19 
  *p=0.0914 
  1.33 
   p=0.2861
22.21 
p=0.6161
-0.24 
**p=0.0299 
0.23 
**p=0.0440
   0.21 
**p=0.0525
Latino   0.19 
   p=0.1935 
   -0.83 
  p=0.6021
  -13.67 
p=0.8088
-0.42 
  ***p=0.0049 
-0.45 
   ***p=0.0026
-0.23 
   *p=0.0859
Native American -0.38 
*p=0.0640 
  -8.26 
  ***p=0.0007
-302.22  
***p=0.0005
  0.18 
  p=0.3809 
-0.22 
  p=0.3244
-0.40 
  **p=0.0489
Asian   0.80 
  ***p=0.0106 
7.43 
  ***p=0.0081
  193.79  
**p=0.0519
  -0.79 
  ***p=0.0127 
0.49 
**p=0.0283
  0.21 
   p=0.3819
African American   -0.19 
  **p=0.0209 
  -6.79 
   ***p=<.0001
  -218.78  
***p=<.0001
  0.00 
  p=0.9838 
-0.40 
  ***p=<.0001
  -0.41 
   ***p=<.0001
Other ethnicity 0.49 
**p=0.0340 
   3.74 
    p=0.1253
145.46  
*p=0.0940
  -0.97 
   ***p=0.0004 
0.03 
  p=0.8724
0.31 
  p=0.1347
4-Year college 
graduate 
0.71 
  ***p=<.0001 
7.63 
  ***p=<.0001
    280.55 
  ***p=<.0001
-0.88 
***p=<.0001 
0.20 
  p=0.1812
  0.59 
  ***p=<.0001
Total income   0.01 
  p=0.2517 
   0.17 
  ***p=0.0009
  5.42 
***p=0.0033
-0.01 
  p=0.4773 
0.01 
  ***p=0.0041
0.01 
   ***p=0.0165
Total assets 0.01 
   ***p=<.0001 
  0.01 
  ***p=<.0001
   0.28 
***p=<.0001
-0.01 
***p=0.0021 
0.01 
  ***p=0.0156
0.01 
  ***p=0.0003
TANF recipient 0.18 
p=0.1780 
  2.99 
  **p=0.0524
115.79  
**p=0.0350
-0.09 
p=0.4751 
-0.17 
  p=0.2824
   0.05 
p=0.7200
Asset-specific 
education 
  0.01 
*p=0.0619 
    0.01 
   p=0.7834
      0.14 
   p=0.9318
-0.01 
  **p=0.0544 
  0.01 
  p=0.1210
  0.01 
  *p=0.0774
General financial 
education 
0.02 
  ***p=<.0001 
  0.21 
   ***p=0.0002
  7.42  
***p=0.0001
-0.02 
  ***p=0.0003  
0.02 
  ***p=0.0005
0.02 
  ***p=0.0020
Match rate 0.09 
  **p=0.0242 
  -0.02 
  p=0.9710
-17.19  
p=0.3003
-0.10 
  ***p=0.0187 
-0.01 
  p=0.8984
  0.07 
   p=0.1108
Match cap   0.01 
  **p=0.0242 
  0.97 
  ***p=<.0001
     0.42 
   ***p=<.0001
-0.01 
   **p=0.0202 
-0.01 
   ***p=0.0117
0.00 
  p=0.7921
Direct deposit   0.18 
p=0.2038 
   2.14 
  p=0.1592
69.29 
***p=0.19
-0.14 
p=0.3138 
-0.01 
  p=0.9279
0.15 
   p=0.2479
Log likelihood or R²  LL=-998.59 R²=0.38 R²=0.43  LL=-975.24  LL=-851.52 LL= -975.29
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
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Results Summary 
 
 In exploring the role of health insurance for Individual Development Account 
participants, I find that insurance operates as a significant mediator for savings and asset 
accumulation, increasing the likelihood of success by 10% to 20% depending on the outcome. 
Medical loans and debt, a related variable of interest, is also significantly correlated with each of 
the six savings outcomes, decreasing the likelihood of success by 11% to 34% depending on the 
outcome.  Coefficient estimates and marginal effects from Specification D of each outcome are 
reported in Table 12.  This knowledge that health insurance and medical debt significantly 
affects savings outcomes is critical for ensuring IDA participant success. 
 
Table 12: Results Summary for each Savings Outcome 
* = significant at 90% confidence level (p ≤ .10) 
** = significant at 95% confidence level (p ≤ .05) 
*** = significant at 99% confidence level (p ≤ .01) 
 = if shaded, significant at any of these three confidence levels 
 
Coefficient estimate 
Marginal effect 
P-value 
Outcome 1: 
Saver 
Outcome 2: 
AMND 
Outcome 3: 
Gross Deposits 
Outcome 4: 
Drop Out 
Outcome 5: 
Finished 
Outcome 6: 
Asset Purchase 
Regression technique Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit 
Mean 0.62 18.12 624.00 0.34 0.24 0.40 
 
Intercept -0.48 
*p=0.0660 
21.85 
***p=<.0001 
  131.31 
p=0.2421 
   0.28 
  p=0.2933 
-0.31 
p=0.2494 
-0.58 
   **p=0.0268 
Health insurance   0.17 
ME=.06 
  ***p=0.0167 
  2.54  
 
***p=0.0028 
  94.51 
 
***p=0.0017 
-0.19 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0050 
  0.01 
ME=0.01 
   p=0.8508 
  0.12 
ME=0.05 
     *p=0.0875 
Medical loans/debt -0.18 
ME=-0.07 
***p=0.0131 
  -3.47   
 
***p=0.0001 
-126.46 
 
***p=<.0001 
0.14 
ME=0.05 
 *p=0.0607 
  -0.29 
ME=-0.08 
***p=0.0004 
-0.18 
ME=-0.07 
   ***p=0.0177 
Exogenous participant 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Key IDA program 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other key variables 
 
– – – – – – 
Model F – 35.91   
***p=<.0001 
 46.61   
***p=<.0001 
– – – 
Log likelihood or R² -1064.61   0.32 0.38 -1046.12   -913.62   -1052.99 
N 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 
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Discussion Section and Conclusions 
 
 Prior research has revealed that both health insurance and asset accumulation are 
correlated with positive or improved health outcomes.  Now, this practicum shows that health 
insurance improves success rates for low-income individuals who wish to save and build assets 
in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency.  As a result, policymakers and program 
administrators can use this knowledge about the importance of health insurance as a mediator – 
and medical debt as a hindrance – to better meet the needs of Individual Development 
Accountholders and ensure both positive health and savings outcomes.   
 
Policy and Program Implications 
 A primary policy concern is that the application of low asset limits for many federal and 
state public assistance programs serves as a disincentive for saving.  Currently, participants of 
IDAs funded through the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) or state-run programs funded 
through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) will not lose their benefits.   
However, these legislative exceptions do not apply to other federally and privately funded 
IDAs.69  In comparison, retirement savings in pension plans are universally excluded from 
consideration, while 401(k)s are excluded by some programs.70  Once an individual reaches the 
designated asset limit, he/she will lose eligibility for that public service.71  For example, $1,000 
per household is the maximum asset amount allowed for Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in most states and $2,000 is the federal maximum amount of 
assets allowed in order to qualify for food stamps.72  Assuming a participant had no prior assets, 
                                                 
69 Frank, Vikki et al.  IDA Participation and Public Benefits Eligibility, p. 1. 
70 Boshara et al.  Policy Options for Achieving an Ownership Society for All Americans, p. 11. 
71 Boshara, et al.  Policy Options to Encourage Savings and Asset Building by Low-Income Americans, p. 4. 
72 State Policy Choices: Assets and Access to Public Assistance, p. 2. 
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saves $500, and receives a $500 match in a program with a $1 to $1 match, he will have already 
exceeded the $1,000 asset limit for public health benefits.73  An even worse scenario could result 
for those who already have assets prior to starting their IDA; they would have a disincentive 
from enrolling at all because they would lose crucial support by doing so.  Yet, public assistance 
is vital for many low-income individuals to maintain a respectable standard of living and is 
correlated with increased savings deposits in this sample.  The majority (70-75%)74 of 
participants who previously or currently had some form of public assistance (TANF, SSI, or food 
stamps) also had health insurance coverage.75  A case in point: current TANF recipients have 
AMNDs that are statistically $3.00 or 17% higher than the mean AMND and gross deposits that 
are $116 or 19% higher than the mean.76
 Thus, policies that are intended to help low-income families actually penalize those who 
try to accumulate assets – both in terms of savings and health outcomes.77  Since states have 
flexibility in setting asset criteria in public health insurance plans for children under Medicaid 
and SCHIP, future legislation should raise or eliminate the asset limits to be more realistic for 
contemporary needs,78 as well as specify that any savings in any IDA (along with any matching 
deposits and interest) shall be disregarded in determining eligibility for means-tested programs.79   
 Similarly, restrictive rules for recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a 
population with intense health care needs and costs that likely far exceed those of this sample, 
                                                 
73 Remember the average total net deposits plus match for IDA participants in the ADD was $1,543.   
74 See Appendix Table E for health insurance coverage rates by public assistance status. 
75 This is likely because these participants also qualified for public health insurance through Medicaid or Medicare. 
76 See Table 11 for the effect of current TANF status on savings outcomes 2 and 3.  This is perhaps because these 
participants have a stable and constant amount of income from which to make deposits.   
77 State Policy Choices: Assets and Access to Public Assistance, p. 1. 
78 While many assistance programs index income limits for eligibility, asset limits have failed to keep pace with 
rising costs and could be indexed for inflation as some states have already done.   Boshara, et al.  Policy Options for 
Achieving an Ownership Society for All Americans, p. 11. 
79 Boshara, et al.  Policy Options to Encourage Savings and Asset Building by Low-Income Americans, p. 4; State 
Policy Choices: Assets and Access to Public Assistance, p. 2. 
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should be modified.  Currently, federal IDA policy requires that deposits into IDAs consist only 
of “earned income,” yet since SSI recipients cannot work and do not have earned income, they 
are unable to save in an IDA.  To alleviate this inequity, the “earned income” qualification could 
be waived for this population.  This update on earned income policies will lead to both better 
savings and health outcomes for IDA participants and other affected low-income individuals. 
 Another noteworthy finding of this study is the severity and frequency of prior participant 
debt – especially medical debt – as a savings barrier.80  Unfortunately, this is not an area that is 
typically addressed by most IDA policies and programs.  To resolve this critical problem, IDA 
policymakers and program administrators could consider offering health care-related expenses as 
allowable asset purchases in addition to the three most frequently approved asset goals – 
education, homeownership, and microenterprise.  Potential health care assets could include 
premiums for health insurance, surgery, prescription drugs, or health care equipment.  While not 
a traditional, tangible asset, this form of human capital is a necessary and worthwhile long-term 
investment to ensure one’s future employment, earnings, assets, and family.   
 Meanwhile awaiting potential policy changes in the future, IDA administrators and staff 
can begin to incorporate these research findings into their programs immediately.  Since having 
health insurance is positively correlated with more successful savings outcomes for IDA 
participants, IDA programs could encourage potential and current IDA participants to enroll in 
health insurance programs or help them obtain public health assistance so that medical bills and 
emergencies will not interfere with their savings efforts.  Another strategy would be to help 
participants seek means for minimizing medical bills and receiving affordable health care, such 
                                                 
80 The amount of medical debt in this sample is the second largest type of debt and the highest proportion of 
participants struggle to afford their health care needs above any other costs. 
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as utilizing prescription plans or free health clinics.  This may improve both personal financial 
and health conditions for participants, as well as ensure more successful IDA outcomes. 
 With this knowledge about the importance of health insurance, IDA program 
administrators can better design their programs to ensure IDA participant success.  First, they can 
promote health insurance coverage and its importance to their clients at enrollment, orientations, 
and as part of the IDA training sessions.  If participants do not already have employer-sponsored 
health insurance, public assistance, or private coverage, program administrators can attempt to 
connect IDA savers to health insurance coverage, such as by encouraging participants to seek 
employment that would provide health insurance coverage or by determining if they are eligible 
for public assistance.  If participants already receive this public benefit through Medicaid or 
Medicare, staff must ensure that they retain this coverage.  Occasionally, other public agencies 
are not aware that certain IDAs are exempt from asset limits.  As a result, program staff must 
advocate on behalf of their participants to inform other agencies of these IDA exemptions to be 
sure that their new savings does not penalize them from receiving this crucial health care 
assistance.  Knowing that some IDA participants tend to postpone doctor’s visits in order to save 
money, program administrators can also ensure that their participants maintain their health care 
needs throughout the duration of their IDA and do not sacrifice their health in order to meet their 
savings goals.  Instead, they can continue to promote other savings strategies that do not require 
personal hardship, such as creating budgets or using coupons. 
 Finally, while IDA programs offer a plethora of other valuable services and case 
management assistance, many are not helping with this crucial need.  As some organizations 
already do, more IDA programs should provide participants medical services to both relieve 
medical concerns and prevent further debt accumulation.  Admittedly, this is an expensive 
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benefit for organizations to offer in-house, especially considering how costly and labor-intensive 
IDA programs already are to operate.  At minimum, program staff could refer their participants 
to quality convenient and health care resources that are available to the public for no or low-cost.   
 
Caveats and Limitations 
 Admittedly, my research has its own limitations.  Due to the fact that the data set I utilize 
for this research was non-experimental, the sample and assignment to the treatment of health 
insurance was not chosen at random.  In fact, the participants were both self-selected and 
program-selected into their respective IDA programs.  Perhaps an indication of this selection bias 
is that participants in the ADD were disproportionately female, African American, not married, 
more likely at enrollment to be employed or to be students, and to have attended or graduated 
from college compared to low-income people in general.  As a result of the fact my sample is 
better off than the broader low-income population, it is possible that my results are biased 
downward and that similar tests on the effect of health insurance conducted for a more 
disadvantaged sample of low-income people would yield even larger effects.   
 Longitudinal data would have been better suited than cross-sectional to explore this topic.  
Knowing whether participants had health insurance throughout the whole program; when and for 
how long respondents have insurance rather than status at a certain point would permit us to see 
if a change in insurance status or medical shock directly coincides with negative savings 
outcomes, as well as whether this change in savings behavior is a short-term, recoverable shock 
or a permanent result.   
 Another caveat is that the participants in the American Dream Demonstrations were only 
asked a simple “yes” or “no” question regarding their health insurance status.  As a result, it is 
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not possible to discern with this data which type of health insurance participants had – public 
assistance, employer-sponsored, or private health insurance – let alone how much participants 
paid for their health insurance coverage, premiums, co-pays, prescription drugs, or other medical 
expenses out-of-pocket, which would likely vary depending on their coverage type.    Finally, in 
any study, there is the risk that omitted variables, especially those that are unobservable, will bias 
the results.  For example, perhaps some participants have a natural “propensity to save” that I am 
unable to capture in my regression analysis.  
 
Directions for Future Research  
 Since this research revealed the correlation between health insurance coverage and five 
positive savings behaviors and outcomes in IDAs, future research could explore whether any 
specific type of health insurance coverage is correlated with these same dependent variables or 
any other key IDA outcome.   Another interesting question would be whether participants have 
less medical debt with certain coverage types; if participants spent less money overall and a 
smaller percent of their income on their health care needs and out-of-pocket expenses, they 
would have more disposable income available to save in their IDA as a result.   
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
Table A: Participant Demographics 
Independent Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Female 1855 0.79 0.40 1 0 1
  
Age 1855 36.25 10.33 36 13 72
  
Rural (pop. 2,500 or less) 1855 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
  
Caucasian 1855 0.37 0.48 0 0 1
African American 1855 0.48 0.49 0 0 1
Asian American 1855 0.02 0.14 0 0 1
Latino 1855 0.08 0.27 0 0 1
Native American 1855 0.03 0.16 0 0 1
Other Ethnicity 1855 0.03 0.16 0 0 1
  
Single 1855 0.48 0.50 0 0 1
Married 1855 0.22 0.42 0 0 1
Divorced/Separated 1855 0.27 0.45 0 0 1
Widowed 1855 0.02 0.15 0 0 1
  
Did not complete high school 1855 0.14 0.35 0 0 1
High school graduate or GED 1855 0.22 0.41 0 0 1
Some college 1855 0.39 0.49 0 0 1
2-year college graduate 1855 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
4-year college graduate 1855 0.11 0.31 0 0 1
College graduate* 1855 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
       
Unemployed 1855 0.06 0.24 0 0 1
Not working 1855 0.04 0.20 0 0 1
Student, not working 1855 0.05 0.21 0 0 1
Student, working 1855 0.05 0.23 0 0 1
Employed part-time 1855 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Employed full-time 1855 0.60 0.49 0 0 1
  
Number of adults in household  1855 1.51 0.73 1 0 6
Number of kids in household 1855 1.73 1.51 2 0 9
*= 2- or 4- year college unknown 
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Table B: Participant Income, Assets, Public Assistance, and Insurance Status 
Independent Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Total assets 1855 196.62 376.40 35.00 0 4270.00
Missing total assets* 1855 0.03 0.16 0 0 1
Total monthly income 1855 15.14 8.97 13.94 0 67.60
Missing monthly income* 1855 0.02 0.13 0 0 1
Formerly received TANF  1855 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
Currently receive TANF 1855 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
Receive food stamps  1855 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Missing food stamps* 1855 0.01 0.10 0 0 1
Receive SSI/SSDI 1855 0.11 0.31 0 0 1
Life insurance 1855 0.42 0.49 0 0 1
* = Indicator variable for those observations that were missing for independent variable of interest.  
 
Table C: Program Account Structure and Design 
Independent Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Use of direct deposit 1855 0.07 0.25 0 0 1
Match rate ($X : $1) 1855 2.07 1.07 2 1 7
Match cap ($) 1855 1376.54 836.09 1000.00 250.00 6000.00
Lifetime match cap 1855 0.48 0.49 0 0 1
Time cap (months) 1855 32.87 7.83 36 4 54
General financial education 
completed (hours) 1855 10.39 8.11 10 0 60
Missing general financial 
education* 1855 0.07 0.26 0 0 1
Asset-specific education 
completed (hours) 1855 3.36 10.21 0 0 100 
Missing asset-specific 
financial education* 1855 0.67 0.47 1 0 1
* = Indicator variable for those observations that were missing for independent variable of interest.  
 
Table D: Participant Relationship with Organization 
Independent Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Employee of host 
organization 1855 0.03 0.17 0 0 1
Existing relationship with 
host organization 1855 0.41 0.49 0 0 1
Missing existing relationship 
with host organization 1855 0.013 0.11 0 0 1
Referral from partner 
organization 1855 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Missing referral from 
partner organization 1855 0.15   0.35 0 0 1
* = Indicator variable for those observations that were missing for independent variable of interest.  
 
 Center for Social Development 43 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Table E: Cross Tab of Participant Demographics by Health Insurance 
Frequency
Row Percent N 
Without 
Health 
Insurance 
With 
 Health 
Insurance 
Did not complete high school 260 96 36.92 
164 
63.08
Completed high school or GED 407 145 35.63 
262 
64.37
Some college 726 245 33.75 
481 
66.25
Graduated 2-year college 
 129
36 
27.91 
93 
72.09
Graduated college (2- or 4- year    
    unknown) 129
41 
31.78 
88 
68.22
Graduated 4-year college 204 63 30.88 
141 
69.12
  
Unemployed 117 58 49.57 
59 
50.43
Homemaker, retired, or disabled 
(not working) 79
27 
34.18 
52 
65.82
Student, not working 
 88
31 
35.23 
57 
64.77
Student, working 
 101
40 
39.60 
61 
60.40
Employed part-time 
 357
151 
42.30 
206 
57.70
Employed full-time 1112 319 28.69 
793 
71.31
  
Formerly received TANF  
 783
222 
28.35 
561 
71.65
Currently receive TANF 185 46 24.86 
139 
75.14
Receive food stamps  304 89 29.28 
215 
70.72
Receive SSI/SSDI 205 53 25.85 
152 
74.15
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Table F: Interactions with Participant Demographics and Health Insurance 
Interaction Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Median Min. Max 
Health Insurance * Female 1855 0.54 0.49 1 0 1
  
Health Insurance * Age 1855 23.87   18.95 29 0 72
  
Health Insurance * Rural  1855 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
  
Health Insurance * Caucasian 1855   0.25 0.43 0 0 1
Health Insurance * African American 1855 0.33 0.47 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Asian American 1855 0.02 0.12 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Latino 1855 0.04 0.20 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Native American 1855 0.02 0.12 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Other Ethnicity 1855 0.01   0.12 0 0 1
  
Health Insurance * Single 1855 1.01 0.94 1 0 6
Health Insurance * Married 1855 0.15 0.36 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Divorced/Separated 1855 0.19 0.39 0 0 1
Health Insurance * Widowed 1855 0.01 0.11 0 0 1
  
Health Insurance * Number of Adults  1855 1.01 0.94 1 0 6
Health Insurance * Number of Kids  1855 1.23 1.49 1 0 9
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